國防部長羅伯特.蓋茨（Robert M. Gates）在國際戰略研究所的講話（香格里拉對話會）
祝賀國際戰略研究所（International Institute for Strategic Studies）達到舉辦第十屆香格里拉安全對話這一重要的里程碑。在這段相對不長的時間裏，這一會議成為了參加國之間鼓勵對話及相互了解的極其重要的論壇。
這 是我以國防部長身份連續第五次 - 如你們所知 - 也將是最後一次參加這一對話。有機會領導美國國防部達四年半之久是我的極大榮幸，為此，我要感謝布殊總統和奧巴馬總統。這也使我能從以下角度來討論我今天想談的主要話題：美國對亞洲的承諾，即使是在過渡和變革時期，始終持久不變。
作為一個在為八位總統效力後即將離開政府的人，我對過渡可能造成的不確定性有所了解。事實上，我在過去在這裡發表的講話中已談及這個問題。在2008年的年會上，在並不知道美國總統選舉會有甚麼結果的情況下 - 當然根本沒有想到我還會成為新一屆政府成員 - 我就說，幾乎可以肯定下一任美國總統將會保持我們之間的接觸，並保持我們在本地區的存在。正如記載顯示，而且我希望我的講話也能進一步表明，在奧巴馬總統任期內，這種接觸不僅得以保持，而且還在各個方面得到擴大和增進。我相信，在被提名接替我的出色領導人利昂_帕內塔（Leon Panetta）的任期內，美國的防務政策也會是同樣的情況。
近幾年美國在亞洲參與的廣度和強度突出說明瞭這點 - 即使是在國內經濟困難時期和伊拉克和阿富汗有兩個重大軍事行動同時進行的情況下。三年前，我曾在這個會議上說過，當時我已經是18個月裏第四次對亞太地區進行要事訪問。現在，我可以向你們報告，這是我在過去四年半裏的第14次亞洲之行。下個月，國務卿克林頓將開始她對亞洲的第八次訪問，奧巴馬總統在任的每一年都到亞洲進行要事訪問。
事實上，我訪問亞洲所見到的最引人注目 - 最讓人驚奇的 - 的變化之一，是整個地區對加強與美國的軍方對軍方關係的普遍願望 - 比我20年前在政府任職期間要強烈得多。
在本地區過去50年的劇烈變化中，美國作為一個太平洋國家的承諾和存在是為數極少的不變數之一。但在這個地區變化的同時，美國不僅在亞太地區保持存在上，而且在改善這種存在上都一直表現出靈活性 - 通過更新關係、發展新的能力以及改變我們的防禦態勢以迎接所面對的挑戰。
想想看，在地震24小時之內，美國發起了"朋友"（TOMODACHI）行動，協助日本自衛隊向受災地區提供援助 - 日本政府動員了10萬多名自衛隊隊員。在這些密切協調的聯合救援的高峰時，美國有24000多人、190架飛機、24艘艦船支援日本救災。美軍和日本自衛隊把救援物資運送到受災社區、修復交通基礎設施、在受災沿岸搜索倖存者。這些努力表明了美軍和日本自衛隊之間高水準的共同運作能力，證明了兩國多年來在聯合訓練和能力方面所給予的投資的正確性。今天，很顯然，這個聯盟不僅經受住了這場悲劇，而且變得更加強大、更加重要。
美國與大韓民國的聯盟是我們亞太安全戰略的另一支柱 - 它起源於冷戰，旨在面對這個地區和全球一系列新的挑戰。我們兩國軍方在繼續發展我們在必要的情況下防止和挫敗北韓侵略的綜合能力。但美韓同盟的目的並不單 純是為了對抗另一個國家。它也必須帶有某種捍衛目標才能有意義和經得起長期考驗。在這方面，我們為建立一個真正的"全球"聯盟並與其他國家合作應對世界各地 - 如海地或阿富汗 - 的危機局勢所作的努力，顯示出我們對促進南韓以外的穩定和繁榮的共同承諾。
我們還在與中國共同努力建立積極、合作和全面的關係。在這一努力中，我們正在看 到上世紀70年代美國三位總統 - 共和黨人和民主黨人 - 為發展兩國關係而作出的富有膽識的決策所帶來的成果，這些決策最終導致1979年兩國實現關係正常化。我身為一名年輕的白宮助理在那個進程中的經歷，是我職業生涯的亮點之一。
30年之後，作為國防部長，我將與中國建立軍方對軍方關係確定為一項重點，近幾個月來，這一關係在穩步發展。今年1 月，我對中國進行了具有非常積極意義的訪問，就在幾個星期前，我們的參謀長聯席會議主席馬倫海軍上將（Admiral Mullen）邀請了中國人民解放軍總參謀長陳炳德上將來美國進行為期一週的訪問。陳上將訪美期間參觀了美國不同的軍事設施。我對能再次會晤和對話總是感到高興，我們也非常高興在這裡的香格里拉對話中與他見面。
同樣令人矚目的是，過去10年來美國與印度關係的改善 - 從冷戰時期的不安共存到基於共同民主價值觀以及重要經濟與安全利益的夥伴合作關係。這一夥伴關係將成為南亞以及更廣泛地區穩定的不可或缺的支柱。無論是打擊海盜活動，加強多邊領域的參與，還是援助阿富汗的發展，我們的合作關係都在發揮關鍵性的作用。
雖然加強我們在亞太地區的雙邊關係一直是 我們在這一地區的關鍵重點，但美國同時也大力注重於幫助促進新的多邊合作。長期以來，亞洲安全環境所面臨的一項關鍵性的挑戰是，這一地區國家間缺乏強有力的合作機制。過去幾年來，我將正在進行的解決這一問題的努力視為我個人的一項首要目標。因此，去年美國成為第一個非東盟國家接受邀請出席東盟國防部長擴大會議（ASEAN Defense Ministers Plus Forum）。去年10月，我在河內榮幸地出席了首屆東盟國防部長擴大會議，我對它將成為一個關鍵性機構，推動在一些涉及共同利益的領域取得進展感到樂 觀，這些領域包括海事安全、人道援助和救災、以及維和行動等。
海事安全仍是這一地區尤其重要的問題，領土要求以及對海洋領域的恰當使用等問題，給地區穩定與繁榮帶來持續挑戰。美國在海事安全問題上的立場依然是明確的：航行自由、不受阻隔的經濟發展和商務以及遵循國際法，均為我們的國家利益 所在。我們還認為，《聯合國海洋法公約》（UN Convention on the Law of the Sea）所體現的國際法慣例，為恰當利用海洋領域提供了明確指導以及使用權。通過在適當的地區和多邊論壇進行合作，以及遵循我們認為對這一地區各方有益的 原則，我們能夠確保各方享有平等和公開的運用國際水路的權利。
即使如此，我們仍認識到，美國的防務合作 - 從我們的前沿部署部隊，到與地區夥伴國家一起舉行演習等 - 將繼續為這一地區的穩定發揮不可或缺的作用。儘管近年來美國和本地區的媒體把注意力集中在我們對在東北亞傳統盟國的駐軍安排進行現代化建設的努力上 - 我們對於這些努力的承諾是毋庸置疑的 - 我們也已經採取了多項步驟，努力在整個亞太地區建立一個地域分佈更為合理、行動運作更為靈活機動、在政治上更能持久的防衛態勢。這樣一個態勢在維持我們在 東北亞的存在的同時，也將增進我們在東南亞以及印度洋地區的存在。
在 新加坡，我們正在《戰略框架協議》（Strategic Framework Agreement）的架構下加強我們的雙邊防務關係並力爭展開更多的行動合作，其中最顯著的是在新加坡部署美國瀕海戰鬥艦（U.S. Littoral Combat Ships）。我們正在探討增加兩國軍隊聯合訓練與行動的機會的其他方式，其中包括：
如我在上星期的講話中所說，從預算中取消了問題最多和最值得質疑的武器項目以後，我們所要做的是國防領導人所認為的對未來絕對關鍵的現代化努力 - 關係到空中優勢和機動性、遠端攻擊、核威懾、海上通道、太空和網路、情報、監視和偵察等。雖然審議工作尚未完成，但我相信所保留的這些關鍵性現代化項目 - 它們是對我們在亞洲的軍事戰略尤其重要的系統 - 將會居於我們未來國防預算的首位或接近首位。
美國日益擴大參與亞洲事務的紀錄，加上對於維護我國在這個地區的友邦和合作夥伴的安全、主權和自由最需要的能力建設進行的投資表明，美國對世界這個地區 - 用老話說就是 - 說話算數，並且將繼續這樣做。即使面臨海外新的威脅和國內的財政挑戰，這些項目正在如期擴大並將在未來進一步發展，確保我們以應有的軍力、態勢和存在繼續 履行作為一個21世紀亞太國家的承諾。
當我於上世紀70年代中期完成了公職生涯的第一個十年的時候，關於美國在世界上的地位、它在亞洲的地位以及它最終成功的前景這些方面，美國當時甚至面臨著比今天還多得多的尖銳問題。但正是在這樣一段充滿挫折的時期內，通過美國兩黨的政府所推行的一系列政策奠定了今後數十年各種局勢出現顯著轉機的基礎：在冷戰中獲勝及蘇聯的解體、鐵幕背後和全世界各地億萬人民獲得解放、亞洲率先重新開創全球欣欣向榮的時期。儘管有過種種相反的預測，但美國在越南遭到的挫折並沒有註定結束我們對亞洲事務的參與，事實上 - 如我剛才所說 - 我們尋求同中國建立了一種新的關係，並自那時以來一直在擴大我們在這一地區 - 包括越南在內 - 的防衛夥伴關係。
Defense Secretary Gates on U.S. Commitments in Asia
04 June 2011
U.S. Department of Defense
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
International Institute for Security Studies (Shangri-La Dialogue)
As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates,
Saturday, June 04, 2011
Thank you, John, for that kind introduction.
And congratulations to the International Institute for Strategic Studies on reaching this important milestone with the tenth Shangri-La Security Dialogue. This conference, in that relatively short span of time, has become a vital forum for encouraging dialogue and understanding among the participant countries.
I’d also like to extend my thanks to the government of Singapore for hosting us once again, and to the Shangri-La hotel staff for all their hard work as well. Although the mix of weighty topics and senior governmental officials is clearly the main draw for attendees, I’ve long suspected that one of the key reasons people keep coming back to this event is the wonderful hospitality of this hotel and this city.
Indeed, this is the fifth consecutive year I’ve participated in this dialogue as Secretary of Defense, and as you know, it will be my last. The opportunity to lead the United States Department of Defense for four and a half years has been an extraordinary honor, for which I thank both President Bush and President Obama. It has also given me perspective on the principal subject I want to discuss today: the enduring and consistent nature of America’s commitments in Asia, even in times of transition and change.
As someone who will leave government having served eight presidents, I know something about the uncertainty that transitions can cause. In fact, I’ve touched on this subject in my remarks here before. At the 2008 session, not knowing what the outcome of the United States presidential election would be – and certainly not thinking that I would be a member of the new administration – I said that the next American president would be almost certain to sustain our engagement and our presence in this region. As the record shows, and my speech I hope will make clear, under President Obama that engagement has not only been sustained, it has been broadened and enhanced in a variety of ways. And I believe the same will hold true with respect to U.S. defense policy under Leon Panetta, the distinguished statesman nominated as my successor.
Nonetheless, we meet today at a time when the United States faces a daunting set of challenges at home and abroad. When questions are being raised about the sustainability and credibility of our commitments around the world. These questions are serious and legitimate.
No doubt, fighting two protracted and costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has strained the U.S. military’s ground forces, and worn out the patience and appetite of the American people for similar interventions in the future. On the domestic front, the United States is emerging slowly from a serious recession with huge budget deficits and growing debt that is putting new scrutiny and downward pressure on the U.S. defense budget.
These are some of the stark realities we face, to be sure. But at the same time, it is important, in this place, before this audience, to recognize an equally compelling set of facts with respect to America’s position in Asia. A record demonstrating that, irrespective of the tough times the U.S. faces today, or the tough budget choices we confront in the years to come, that America’s interests as a Pacific nation – as a country that conducts much of its trade in the region – will endure. And the United States and Asia will only become more inextricably linked over the course of this Century. As I hope my presentation today will show, these realities, and this understanding – shared by U.S. leaders and policy makers across the political spectrum – argue strongly for sustaining our commitments to allies while maintaining a robust military engagement and deterrence posture across the Pacific Rim.
This statement is underscored by the significant growth in the breadth and intensity of U.S. engagement in Asia in recent years – even at a time of economic distress at home and two major military campaigns ongoing in Iraq and Afghanistan. Three years ago, I spoke at this gathering and touted the fact that I was on my fourth major trip to Asia-Pacific in the previous 18 months. Now, I can report that this is my fourteenth Asia trip over the last four and a half years. Next month, Secretary of State Clinton will embark on her eighth trip to Asia, and President Obama has made a major Asia trip each year he has been in office.
Indeed, one of the most striking – and surprising – changes I’ve observed during my travels to Asia is the widespread desire across the region for stronger military-to-military relationships with the United States – much more so than during my last time in government 20 years ago.
Our engagement in Asia has been guided by a set of enduring principles that have fostered the economic growth and stability of the region. I spoke about these principles last year, but I think it is worth reiterating our commitment to them once more today:
‥ Free and open commerce;
‥ A just international order that emphasizes rights and responsibilities of nations and fidelity to the rule of law;
‥ Open access by all to the global commons of sea, air, space, and now, cyberspace; and
‥ The principle of resolving conflict without the use of force.
The commitment and presence of the United States as a Pacific nation has been one of relatively few constants amidst the furious changes in this region over the past half-century. But as this region has changed, America has always shown the flexibility not only maintain our presence in the Asia-Pacific, but to enhance it – by updating relationships, developing new capabilities, and transforming our defense posture to meet the challenges of the day.
For example, after fighting a devastating war, the United States and Japan built an alliance that has weathered innumerable tests and proven to be a cornerstone of stability in the region. The most recent and compelling display of the value of our alliance was the sight of the U.S. and Japanese troops working together to bring aid and sustenance to the survivors of the horrific earthquake and tsunami in March.
Consider that within 24 hours of the earthquake, the United States initiated Operation TOMODACHI to deliver assistance to the affected areas in support of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces – more than 100,000 of whom had been mobilized by the Japanese government. At the peak of these closely coordinated joint relief efforts, the United States had more than 24,000 personnel, 190 aircraft, and 24 ships supporting Japan’s response. The U.S. military and Japanese Self-Defense Forces delivered relief supplies to affected communities, repaired transportation infrastructure, and searched for survivors along the affected coast line. This effort demonstrated the high-level of interoperability between the U.S and Japanese defense forces and served to validate years of investments by both nations in combined training and capabilities. Today it is clear that the alliance not only has survived this tragedy, but emerged even stronger and even more vital.
The U.S. alliance with the Republic of Korea remains another pillar of our Asia-Pacific security strategy – one that has emerged out of its Cold War origins to confront a new array of security challenges in the region and globally as well. Our two militaries continue to develop our combined capabilities to deter and defeat, if necessary, North Korean aggression. But the U.S.-ROK alliance is not designed to simply stand against another nation. It must also stand for something, in order to be meaningful and to endure. In this respect, our efforts to build a truly ǒglobalō alliance and to work with others in response to crisis situations around the world, such as in Haiti or Afghanistan, demonstrate our collective commitment to promote stability and prosperity beyond Korea’s shores as well.
Not only in Korea, but in nations across Asia, Cold War turbulence has given way to new partnerships and cooperation. Out of an era of conflict that left an indelible imprint on both our peoples, the United States and Vietnam have forged ahead and built a strong and vibrant bilateral relationship. Together, the United States and Vietnam have demonstrated how to build upon the past without being bound to repeat it. This commitment to overcome seemingly insurmountable obstacles led us to where we are today: partnership on a range of issues including trade and investment, education and health, and security and defense.
We are also now working together with China to build a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship. In that effort, we are seeing the fruits of bold decisions by three American presidents in the 1970s, Republicans and Democrats, to build a rapport between the two nations that ultimately resulted in the normalization of relations in 1979. It was one of the highlights of my professional career to serve as a young staff assistant in the White House when that process unfolded.
Thirty years later, as Secretary of Defense, I have made it a priority to build military-to-military ties with China, which have steadily improved in recent months. Last January, I had a very positive visit to China, and just a few weeks ago our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, hosted General Chen, Chief of the PLA General Staff, for a week-long visit to the United States, where General Chen was shown a number of different U.S. military installations. It’s always my pleasure to meet again with pleasure dialogue, and we are very pleased to see him here at the Shangri-La dialogue.
Also remarkable is the transformation in the U.S.-India relationship over the past decade – from an uneasy coexistence during the Cold War to a partnership based on shared democratic values and vital economic and security interests. A partnership that will be an indispensable pillar of stability in South Asia and beyond. Whether countering piracy, increasing participation in multilateral venues, or aiding the development of Afghanistan, our partnership is playing a vital role.
Although bolstering our bilateral relationships in the region has been a key priority in the Asia-Pacific area, the United States has also made a major commitment to help foster new multilateral cooperation. One of the critical challenges of the Asian security environment has long been the lack of strong mechanisms for cooperation between nations in the region. Over the past few years, I have made it a personal priority to support efforts underway to remedy this problem. This is the reason that last year the United States was the first non-ASEAN nation to accept the invitation to join the ASEAN Defense Ministers Plus forum. It was an honor to attend the inaugural meeting of the ADMM-Plus in Hanoi last October, and I am optimistic that it will be a key body for making progress on a number of issues of shared interest – including maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and peacekeeping operations.
Maritime security remains an issue of particular importance for the region, with questions about territorial claims and the appropriate use of the maritime domain presenting on-going challenges to regional stability and prosperity. The U.S. position on maritime security remains clear: we have a national interest in freedom of navigation; in unimpeded economic development and commerce; and in respect for international law. We also believe that customary international law, as reflected in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, provides clear guidance on the appropriate use of the maritime domain, and rights of access to it. By working together in appropriate regional and multilateral fora, and adhering to principles that we believe are of benefit to all in the region, we can ensure that all share equal and open access to international waterways.
Experience consistently shows that pursuing our common interests together increases our common security. As I have stated before, providing for security and upholding the principles I mentioned earlier is not the task of any one nation alone, but the shared responsibility of all nations. This is the one reason we have placed a premium on building the partner capacity of friends in the region and enhancing the role of multilateral cooperation and organizations in Asia-Pacific security affairs.
Even so, we recognize that the American defense engagement – from our forward deployed forces to exercises with regional partners – will continue to play an indispensable role in the stability of the region. Although much of the press in both the United States and the region has been focused in recent years on our efforts to modernize our basing arrangements with traditional allies in Northeast Asia – and our commitment to those efforts is absolute – we’ve taken a number of steps towards establishing a defense posture across the Asia Pacific that is more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. A posture that maintains our presence in Northeast Asia while enhancing our presence in Southeast Asia and into the Indian Ocean.
For example, this past November, the U.S. and Australia established a force posture working group tasked with expanding opportunities for our two militaries to train and operate together – to include alliance arrangements that would allow for more combined defense activities and shared use of facilities.
Together, we are evaluating a range of options, including:
‥ Increasing our combined naval presence and capabilities to respond more readily to humanitarian disasters;
‥ Improving Indian Ocean facilities – a region of growing international importance; and
‥ Expanding training exercises for amphibious and land operations, activities that could involve other partners in the region.
In Singapore, we are strengthening our bi-lateral defense relationship within the context of the Strategic Framework Agreement and pursuing more operational engagement – most notably, by deploying U.S. Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore. We are examining other ways to increase opportunities for our two militaries to train and operate together, to include:
‥ Prepositioning supplies to improve disaster response;
‥ Improving command and control capabilities; and
‥ Expanding training opportunities to help prepare our forces for the challenges both militaries face operating in the Pacific.
Although we will continue to maintain and enhance our traditional presence in the Asia-Pacific region through efforts such as these, we believe that U.S. presence, and the associated impact and influences should not solely be measured in terms of conventional metrics, or ǒboots on the ground.ō In the coming years, the U.S. military is going to be increasing its port calls, naval engagements, and multilateral training efforts with multiple countries throughout the region. These types of activities not only broaden and deepen our relationships with friends and allies, they help build partner capacity to address regional challenges.
Taken together, all of these developments demonstrate the commitment of the United States to sustaining a robust military presence in Asia – one that underwrites stability by supporting and reassuring allies while deterring, and if necessary defeating, potential adversaries.
No doubt, sustaining this forward military presence and commitments is costly, and cannot be disentangled from the wider discussions of the U.S. fiscal predicament in general, and the pressures on our defense budget in particular. I know this topic is top of the mind at this conference and around the region.
As I noted at the beginning of my remarks, the U.S. faces some serious fiscal challenges at home, and the defense budget – even if not the cause of America’s fiscal woes – must be at least part of the solution. Anticipating this scenario, I have spent that last two years carving out as much budget space as possible by cancelling troubled or unneeded weapons programs and culling excess overhead.
As I said at a speech last week, having removed the most troubled and questionable weapons programs from the budget, we are left with modernization efforts that our defense leaders have deemed absolutely critical to the future – relating to air superiority and mobility, long-range strike, nuclear deterrence, maritime access, space and cyber, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. Though the review is not complete, I am confident that these key remaining modernization programs – systems that are of particular importance to our military strategy in Asia – will rank at or near the top of our defense budget priorities in the future.
Many of those key modernization programs would address one of the principal security challenges we see growing over the horizon: The prospect that new and disruptive technologies and weapons could be employed to deny U.S. forces access to key sea routes and lines of communication.
The U.S. Navy and Air Force have been concerned about anti-access and area denial scenarios for some time. These two military services are working together to develop a new concept of operations – called ǒAir-Sea Battleō – to ensure that America’s military will continue to be able to deploy, move, and strike over great distances in defense of our allies and vital interests.
The record of growing U.S. engagement in Asia, combined with the investments being made in capabilities most relevant to preserving the security, sovereignty, and freedom of our allies and partners in the region, show that America is, as the expression goes, putting ǒour money where our mouth isō with respect to this part of the world – and will continue to do so. These programs are on track to grow and evolve further into the future, even in the face of new threats abroad and fiscal challenges at home, ensuring that that we will continue to meet our commitments as a 21st century Asia-Pacific nation – with appropriate forces, posture, and presence.
Now, I acknowledge that are still some myopic souls who will argue that we cannot sustain our role in Asia-Pacific. That there are some voices of gloom and doom who would also argue that the best days of the United States are behind it. No doubt the challenges America faces as a nation are daunting. But as I end my career in government, I remain completely optimistic about the prospects of the United States because I have seen first-hand the staying power and adaptability of America over the course of my life. Indeed, history’s dustbin is littered with dictators and aggressors who underestimated America’s resilience, will, and underlying power.
It was forty-five years ago this summer that I first went to Washington to begin my career at the height of the U.S. buildup in Vietnam. What lay ahead during my first decade in government were:
‥ Two assassinations at home of historic consequence, with violent domestic turmoil;
‥ The resignation of a president in disgrace;
‥ A costly and hasty withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam; and
‥ An economy battered by high inflation and high interest rates.
As I ended my first decade in government in the mid 1970s, the United States faced even more pointed questions about its place in the world, its place in Asia, and its ultimate prospects for success than it does today. But it was during that discouraging period that the groundwork was being laid – through policies pursued by administrations of both American political parties – for the remarkable turn of events of the following decades: victory in the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the liberation of hundreds of millions of people behind the iron curtain and around the world, and a period of renewed global prosperity – with Asia leading the way. And despite predictions to the contrary, America’s setback in Vietnam did not spell the end of our engagement in Asia – in fact, as I mentioned earlier, we pursued a new relationship in China and have been expanding our defense partnerships in the region, including Vietnam, ever since.
There is no way we can predict the future, nor can we predict the effect that decisions made today will have a decade or two from now. But I believe our work in Asia is laying the groundwork for continued prosperity and security for the United States and for all in the region. It has been enormously gratifying through the course of my career to see the profound good that has come about from American engagement in Asia. And as I leave the United States government, I have no doubt that future generations will have a similar story to tell about the benefits of American power, presence and commitment in this region.
For when America is willing to lead the way; when we meet our commitments and stand with our allies, even in troubling times; when we prepare for threats that are on the ground and on the horizon, and even beyond the horizon; and when we make the necessary sacrifices and take the necessary risks to defend our values and our interests – then great things are possible, and even probable for our country, this region, and the world.
(Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. )